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Abstract: We study how changes to the composition and employment of the US Navy combat logistic force (CLF) influence
our ability to supply our navy worldwide. The CLF consists of about 30 special transport ships that carry ship and aircraft fuel,
ordnance, dry stores, and food, and deliver these to client combatant ships underway, making it possible for our naval forces to
operate at sea for extended periods. We have modeled CLF operations to evaluate a number of transforming initiatives that simplify
its operation while supporting an even larger number of client ships for a greater variety of missions. Our input is an employment
schedule for navy battle groups of ships operating worldwide, extending over a planning horizon of 90–180 days. We show how
we use optimization to advise how to sustain these ships. We have used this model to evaluate new CLF ship designs, advise what
number of ships in a new ship class would be needed, test concepts for forward at-sea logistics bases in lieu of conventional ports,
demonstrate the effects of changes to operating policy, and generally try to show whether and how the CLF can support planned
naval operations. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.∗ Naval Research Logistics 55: 800–810, 2008
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My logisticians are a humorless lot. . . they know if my
campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.
Alexander
1. WHAT IS THE COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE,
AND WHY MODEL IT?
Our combat logistics force (CLF) is a fleet of transport
ships that sustains US Navy combatant ships at sea world-
wide. Each transport carries some combination of four basic
commodities: ship fuel, aircraft fuel, ordnance, and dry stores
and food. An underway replenishment (UNREP) rendezvous
of a transport with a client ship (or simultaneously with
more than one) demands superb seamanship to approach, rig
transfer lines and hoses, convey commodities and, perhaps,
personnel, unrig, and depart company. Transports also use
helicopters for vertical replenishment (VERTREP) of client
ships that may be some distance away. The special hardware
and procedures for these operations have been developed and
improved since the 1930s, and permit our navy today to oper-
ate continuously for extended periods at seawithout returning
to any port.
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The CLF is being transformed to a fleet with fewer differ-
ent types of transports, and no more total transports, but it
expects to have to serve more clients for a greater variety of
deployments in the next decade. Conventional planning has
relied on steady-state, average-rate-of-consumption models
and rules-of-thumb to assess CLF ability to re-supply our
fleet operations (for example, see Appendix A in CNA [8]).
Details matter, and we want to determine whether or not,
and how, the new CLF can actually support its anticipated
missions.
We describe how we have modeled CLF operations, and
what we have learned. We present a representative model
that plans transport resupply operationswith daily resolution,
optimizing utilization over any deployment scenario of rea-
sonable length (up to, say, 180 days). Our model takes into
account changing daily consumption of each of four basic
commodities for each client ship, navigational issues such as
slow passages through canals, and the possibility of several
client ships, or groups of ships, running low on the same com-
modity at the same time. Given a deployment scenario and a
current configuration of the CLF fleet of transports, a solu-
tion to our model is a face-valid logistical plan for the CLF
thatminimizes shortfalls of any commodity for any customer,
highlights unavoidable low-inventory events, and maximizes
the utilization of transports by maximizing the total volume
delivered over the scenario.
© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. ∗This article is a US Government
work and, as such, is in the public domain in the United States of
America.
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2. CLF CUSTOMERS: US NAVY COMBATANT
SHIPS
Most US Navy deployments are groups of ships assem-
bled with a particular mission. Some frequent examples are
as follow.
• A carrier strike group consists of a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier (CVN), a guided-missile cruiser (CG),
two guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and a fast
combat replenishment ship. Accompanying attack
submarines are completely autonomous.
• An expeditionary strike group transports a Marine
expeditionary unit on an amphibious assault ship
(LHA or LHD), with a dock landing ship (LSD),
amphibious transport dock (LPD), a CG and two
DDGs.
• A surface strike group consists of ships equipped with
missiles and missile defense weapons, such as a CG
and two DDGs.
• A Littoral Combat Squadron will employ a new class
of small ships where larger ships cannot safely navi-
gate, engaging in anti-surface warfare, mine counter
measures, intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance, homeland defense and maritime interdiction,
and special operations forces support. For logistic
planning purposes, we treat this new, small ship as
a frigate (FFG).
To us, any such deployed group of ships in company is a
CLF customer. We call such a customer a battle group (BG).
3. SCENARIOS: TRANSIT AND BATTLE PLANS
For our purposes, a scenario is set of exogenous, scripted
deployment plans that tells us, day by day, where each battle
group will be and what it will be doing. This daily fidelity
is in keeping with navy practice, where each ship captain
transmits a daily situation report including position and state.
Our scenarios are filtered from larger, much more detailed
contingency plans for a wide variety of missions.
A typical scenario consists of multiple BGs, and for each
BG specifies last-minute in-port preparations and/or prede-
ployment workup training in preparation for deployment, a
high-speed transit to an area where we will show our mil-
itary presence, a surge into combat operations to achieve a
given objective, a sustainment phase to hold that objective,
and perhaps a postcombat period where we stand guard and
provide humanitarian assistance when diplomacy and other
nonmilitary measures unfold.
Of course, we do not believe that any one of our plan-
ning scenarios will ever be followed verbatim. Rather, we
use a wide variety of these to see how we will need to sup-
port such operations, region-by-region, mission-by-mission,
worldwide.
4. DEFINING DEMAND: LOGISTICS PLANNING
FACTORS
Standard deployment scenarios used by navy planners
include all the client ships, where they will be day by day,
and what they will be doing, but do not tell us what logistics
support they will need. That’s our problem to estimate.
Eccles [13] provides a classic document with lessons
learned fromWorldWar II, and advises “all logistics planning
is based on usage factors, which are average figures computed
inmany variousways.” Today,we call such consumption esti-
mates logistics planning factors. For purposes of estimating
demand, we specify the employment state of each ship as, for
example, in port, in transit, operating on station, or in com-
bat. We aggregate demand into four categories: food and dry
stores (STOR), ship fuel (DFM), aviation fuel (JP5), and ord-
nance (ORDN). The number of personnel aboard determines
consumption of STOR, regardless of ship employment. DFM
(distillate fuel, marine) consumption is fairly easy to estimate
from ship engineering publications (e.g., see Brown et al. [6])
and employment state. Ship power consumption is stated in
kilowatts, with a basic “hotel load” required to support the
ship and her crew and systems, and propulsion plant demand
as a function of speed. Some JP5 is consumed by helicopters,
but the overwhelming volume is required by carrier aircraft.
Although some ORDN is consumed in, for example, gun-
nery training, most weight consists of air-dropped munitions
delivered in combat.
5. CLF SHIPS: FLEET COMPOSITION
The combat logistics force is being consolidated to just
three ship types, with 30 total ships (see Fig. 1).
• The TAO187 (Henry J. Kaiser) class was introduced
in 1986 as the first US Navy UNREP ship designed
for operation by civil service mariners. With a crew
of about 82 civilians and 21 navy personnel, it can
carry about 180,000 barrels of fuel oil, and 271 tons of
cargo lube oil, dry stores, and refrigerated containers,
at about 20 knots.
• The T-AOE6 (Supply) Class was introduced in 1994,
andwith a crewof about 176 civilians and 59 navy per-
sonnel, it can carry 156,000 barrels of fuel oil, 1,800
tons of ordnance, 250 tons of dry stores, and 400 tons
of refrigerated stores, at speeds exceeding 26 knots.
This ship also features some self-defense armament.
• The T-AKE1 (Lewis and Clark) joined the fleet in
2006, and with a crew of about 123 civilians and 49
navy personnel, it can carry 18,000 barrels of fuel oil,
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Figure 1. Combat logistics force ship classes. The CLF is shifting
from five to just three classes of support ship, but expects to serve
a fleet growing from 284 to 310 ships. Navy ship class names offer
telltales of function: “T”meansMilitary Sealift Command transport,
commanded and crewed by civilian mariners accompanied by some
uniformed navy crew, “A” auxillary, “O” fuel oil, “E” explosive ord-
nance, “F” refrigerated, and “K” general cargo. The respective crew
complement and steaming speed for each T-AO is 103 and 20 knots,
T-AOE 235 and 26 knots, and T-AKE 172 and 20 knots. The T-AOE
is faster, has defensive armaments, and is favored as a station ship.
The slower T-AO and T-AKE may pair up as station ships, but are
more often used as shuttle ships. [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
5,900 tons of ordnance, dry stores, and refrigerated
stores at up to 20knots.Customarily, each storagehold
is designed to carry either ordnance or dry stores, but
T-AKE storage holds can be converted between the
two.
Other ship classes (e.g., T-AE, T-AFS, T-AOE(X)) are
either scheduled to leave active service for the reserve fleet,
or are still on the drawing boards.
Generally, each ship type is characterized by size, speed
and flexibility. Cost increases with each of these attributes,
especially speed [e.g., [16]].
CLF ships fill one of two roles: a station ship accompanies
a BG group of customer ships, acting as a local storage facil-
ity for the BG, while a shuttle ship transits between BGs and
replenishment ports. A station ship may not be fast enough to
keep up with its BG customers at their top speed, but it needs
to be fast enough to periodically rendezvous with and resup-
ply these customers. The standard term for a shuttle ship
UNREP of a station ship, or serving an entire BG through
several UNREPS, is a consolidation, or CONSOL.
6. SEA ROUTES: NAVIGATING THE WORLD’S
OCEANS
Because where we will need to navigate our CLF ships
worldwide is an output of our planning, rather than an input,
we need an “automated sea routes” model. We could find no
such tool, so we built our own. A key feature of our sea routes
model is that it takes a basic set of worldwide waypoints
and feasible transits between them, and integrates each route
followed by the BGs in a given scenario. This provides a nav-
igable network for transports to follow in service of the BGs.
This sea routes network construction proceeds in four
phases.
1. A a node is defined for each “port” (i.e., a forward
logistics site or an at-sea, pre-positioned modular
cargo delivery system ship) and for each of a number
of at-sea waypoints frequently used by ships navi-
gating worldwide (e.g., Gibraltar gate). A “fast arc”
connects each adjacent pair of these nodes between
which full-speed transit is feasible, and nodes are
positioned such that each fast arc is navigable along
a great circle route.
2. A “slow arc” connects any node pair with a fixed
transit time (e.g., a canal or restricted passage). This
Figure 2. Worldwide sea route network. This particular network is for a case with 13 battle group customers operating over a 90-day planning
horizon. Figure from Doyle [12]. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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base network is scenario independent, and has 102
nodes, 32 of which are ports, connected by 187 fast
arcs and 11 slow arcs.
3. For any given scenario, we then trace the planned
tracks of each BG, adding any daily position not col-
located with one already in the network. Fast arcs
connect these successive daily positions. A typical
scenario might have 13 BG customers in transit for
90 days. After this step, we typically have about 600
nodes and 700 arcs.
4. Wherever a fast arc intersects some other fast arc,
we induce a waypoint, and add the induced fast arcs.
This brings us up to about 900 nodes and 64,000 arcs
(see Fig. 2).
Each node may be assigned an administrative restriction
that limits passage to only a subset of CLF ships. Each port
node may admit only certain classes of CLF ship, or certain
individual ships. These exclusionary devices can be used to
keep CLF ships from leaving particular areas of operation,
and to represent varying levels of access to sea space and
forward supply ports.
Because of these restrictions, we must define a sea route
network for eachCLF shuttle ship that is physically or admin-
istratively distinct from others. There are about 16 of these
shuttle ships for most scenarios (the CLF ships serve as sta-
tion ships for the BGs). Each CLF ship class has its transit
speed (vice its maximum speed), expressed in nautical miles
per day (e.g., T-AO384, T-AKE308, T-AOE600), andwe use
these to compute transit time from the great circle distance
of each fast arc.
Finally, we apply the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [[1], see
pp. 147-150] to generate the shortest point-to-point naviga-
tion times between any two locations in our sea route network,
worldwide.
7. PLANNING CLF EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES:
AN INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM
We use an integer linear program to plan optimal employ-
ment ofCLF ships tominimize policy penalties accruing from
any commodity shortage. An exact formulation follows.
7.1. Indices [∼cardinality]
s ∈ S Shuttle ship [∼25]
p ∈ P Port available to load shuttle ships [∼35]
bg ∈ BG Battle group [∼13] (alias bx, by)
d ∈ D Day [∼181] (alias dx, dy, dh)
c ∈ C Commodity (DFM, JP5, STOR, ORDN) [∼4]
cˆ ⊆ C Dry commodity subject to load fraction
restrictions (STOR, ORDN) (alias c)
7.2. Provided Data [units]
spdSHUTTLEs Speed of shuttle ship s [nm/day]
inptTAT Time to reload shuttle ship in port [days]
portok4ss,p Binary indicator that shuttle ship s can
reload at port p [binary]
legdayss,bg,d,p Shuttle ship s transit time at speed
spdSHUTTLEs from bg position on
day d to port p following given sea
routes and/or BG tracks [days]
useBGbg,d,c Consumption by bg during day d of
commodity c [c-units]
mxloadbg,c Maximum capacity of bg to carry com-
modity c [c-units]
safetyc Minimum desired fraction of
mxloadbg,c to be held at all times
[fraction]
extremisc Extreme minimum desired fraction of
mxloadbg,c to be held at all times,
extremisc ≤ safetyc [fraction].
hitOKbg,d Logical indicator if bg canCONSOLon
day d [binary]
capacitys,c Shuttle ship s capacity to deliver com-
modity c [c-units]
mnfraccˆ, mxfraccˆ Minimum, maximum fraction of T-
AKE dry capacity that must be
loaded with dry commodity cˆ [frac-
tion]
safety_penaltyc Penalty per deficit unit of desired stor-
age below safety-stock held by any
BG [penalty per c-unit]
extremis_factor Multiplier (>1, e.g. 10) for penalty per
deficit unit of desired storage below
extremis held by anyBG [dimension-
less]
negative_factor Multiplier (>extremis_factor, e.g.
1000) for penalty per deficit unit of
desired storage below zero held by
any BG [dimensionless]
7.3. Derived Data
mxconsols,bg,c Maximum delivery shuttle ship s can
make to bg on any day of commod-
ity c [c-units]. This is defined as:
min{mxloadbg,c, capacitys,c}.
mxconsol2s,bg,bx,c Maximum delivery shuttle ship s can
make in one voyage to CONSOL bg
and bx with commodity c [c-units].
This is defined as:min{mxloadbg,c+
mxloadbx,c, capacitys,c}.
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In addition, for T-AKE shuttle ships and dry commodities
cˆ sharing dry storage, and subject to limits on the minimum
and maximum fractions of dry capacity that must be carried







mnf racc˜] ∗ capacitys,cˆ

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or, the maximum permitted T-AKE load of dry commodity
cˆ, or the amount of commodity cˆ that can be loaded after the
minimum loads of other dry commodities c˜ = cˆ sharing dry
storage are loaded.
cycledayss,bg,d,bx,dx If shuttle ship s departs bg on day d
to reload at some port p, the minimum
number of days before a rendezvous

















Note that this admits a cycle with slack time (or, “shuttle
waiting time”) dx − d − cycledayss,bg,d,bx,dx ≥ 0, and that
because of the relative motion of a shuttle ship and a BG over
navigable sea routes, and their daily proximity to ports and to
each other, there will be cases in which planning for a shuttle
to wait for this amount of time is better than restricting plans
to have no such slack.
directdayss,bg,d,bx,dx The number of steaming days for
shuttle s to transit from the posi-
tion of bg on day d directly to the
position of bx on subsequent day
dx (i.e., without reloading in any
port) (policy limits may govern
the minimum or maximum days
allowed between these planned
events).
7.4. Decision Variables
HITs,bg,d Binary indicator of shuttle s CONSOL
visit to bg on day d (depends on
hitOKbg,d )
HIT2s,bg,d,bx,dx Binary indicator of shuttle s CONSOL
visit to bg on day d , followed by a sec-
ond CONSOL visit to bx on day dx
before returning to port (depends on
hitOKbg,d )
CONSOLs,bg,d,c Amount of shuttle s delivery to




Amount of shuttle s deliveries of
commodity c to respectively,
bg on day d (“12”) and bx on
subsequent day dx (“22”)
(i.e., without reloading at some
intermediate port). [c-units]
SHORTAGEbg,d,c amount of inventory deficiency
of c for bg, at end of day d
[c-units]
EXTREMISbg,d,c amount of extreme deficiency of c
for bg, at end of day d [c-units]
NEGINVbg,d,c magnitude of negative inventory

































useBGbg,dh,c − (1 − safetyc)mxloadbg,c ∀bg, d, c
(2)
CONSOLs,bg,d,c ≤ mxconsols,bg,cHITs,bg,d ∀s, bg, d, c
(3)
CONSOL12s,bg,d,bx,dx,c + CONSOL22s,bg,d,bx,dx,c












∀s, bg, d, bx, dx|dx − d < cycledayss,bg,d ,bx,dx (5)
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HIT2s,bx,dx,by,dy ≤ 1 ∀s, d (6)
HITs,bg,d ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, bg, d (7)
HIT2s,bg,d,bx,dx ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, bg, d , bx, dx (8)
0 ≤ CONSOLs,bg,d,c ≤ mxconsols,bg,c ∀s, bg, d, c (9)
0 ≤ CONSOL12s,bg,d,bx,dx,c ≤ mxconsols,bg,c
∀s, bg, d , bx, dx, c (10)
0 ≤ CONSOL22s,bg,d,bx,dx,c ≤ mxconsols,bx,c
∀s, bg, d , bx, dx, c (11)
0 ≤ SHORTAGEbg,d,c
≤ (safetyc − extremisc) ∗ mxloadbg,c ∀bg, d , c (12)
0 ≤ EXTREMISbg,d,c
≤ extremisc ∗ mxloadbg,c ∀bg, d , c (13)


























negative_factor ∗ safety_penaltyc ∗ NEGINVbg,d,c
(15)
8. DISCUSSION
Inequalities (1) limit day-by-day cumulative CONSOL
volumes of each commodity to the cumulative usage of each
BG through the end of that day. We assume that on the first
day, eachBG is full to capacitywith every commodity. There-
after, daily use is deducted, and replenishments are accounted
fromshuttleCONSOLs.Elastic inequalities (2) reckon cumu-
lative inventory state of each commodity at the end of each
planning day, and compare this to the cumulative usage less
desired safety-stock level at the end of that day, represent-
ing any shortage, extreme shortage, or negative inventory
required to reconcile this state. Each inequality (3) limits
the CONSOL volume transferred from a shuttle ship, to a
BG, on some given day, to be zero unless a replenishment
event takes place. Similarly, each inequality (4) controls the
successive CONSOL volumes transferred from a shuttle to a
BG on some given day, followed by a second CONSOL on
a BG on some given later day, to be zero unless a replenish-
ment event takes place for that shuttle on BG on that day,
followed by the second BG on the second day. Constraints
(5) restrict successive shuttle rendezvous with battle groups
so that each such visit is followed by sufficient time to cycle
to a port for re-supply. Each constraint (6) permits a shuttle
to engage in at most one activity on a given day. Variable
domains are stated by constraints (7)–(14). The objective
(15) expresses a penalty with a component for any shortage
below safety-stock, and extreme shortage below minimum
stock, and any negative inventory, less rewards for com-
modity volume delivered; the rewards here are ten percent
of the safety stock shortage penalties, and attract maximal
delivered volumes, rather than merely deliveries to avoid
shortages.
Our model can schedule a single shuttle ship sortie from
port tomake two separateCONSOLvisits, perhaps to twodif-
ferent battle groups. It turns out that allowing multiple CON-
SOLs does not help in our large scenarios, and it increases
the solve times significantly, so we do not use this feature in
those scenarios. For a small 30-day scenario in the Arabian
Gulf, with three battle groups being supported by oneT-AKE,
we find that allowingmultiple CONSOLs per sortie increases
the overall minimum inventory levels seen, but that the differ-
ence is modest. We include this feature to allow the model to
represent a situation that could occur in the real world, but we
conjecture that it is useful in a few circumstanceswheremany
battle groups are close to each other for extended periods, and
have low to moderate consumption of the relevant commodi-
ties. The two-CONSOL sorties can be toggled on and off,
therefore, for completeness, we display in our formulation
the fully general model we have implemented.
9. PRIOR MODELS OPTIMIZING NAVAL
LOGISTICS
Dantzig and Fulkerson [9] present what wewould now call
a pure network formulation to minimize the number of iden-
tical tanker ships required to deliver a fixed slate (schedule)
of naval fuel shipments. Each shipment is characterized by
load day and location, unload day and location, and times for
loaded outbound, and empty return voyages to the next load
location.
Brown, et al. [5] plan crude oil tanker voyages with a set
partition model selecting for each vessel the best employ-
ment schedule among all those feasible over a 60–90 day
planning horizon. The sorties carry full loads of crude oil on
various-sized tankers from Middle East terminals to refiners
in Europe and the Americas.
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
806 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 55 (2008)
Bausch, et al. [2] schedule lighter and barge operations
conveying multiple distilled and refined petroleum products
among coastal port facilities. Tides and complex operating
and safety rules govern hours of operation, each vessel has
distinct cargo capacities and operating rules, and vesselsmust
adjust their speeds to arrive at destinations when they can
dock and transfer cargo.
10. RESULTS: CLF INSIGHTS
The integer linear optimization model (or, if you prefer,
mixed-integer program, or MIP) presented here is the latest
in a series that has evolved to answer a number of questions.
Following are abstracts of our results.
Borden [3] presents seminal work on the history of CLF,
recounts prior analyses and, anticipating decisions to procure
the T-AKE, shapes the fundamental questions:
• How many T-AKEs will be enough?
• What is the optimal T-AKE load of ordnance and dry
stores for its convertible-storage holds?
• How should we operate the T-AKEs?
He develops from scratch three single- and three multiple-
battle group 90-day scenarios variously directed at the
Baltics, Arabian Gulf, Philippines, Panama, and Korea, and
ranging in scale from a minor contingency to a major theater
war. He develops logistics planning factors, a global sea route
model, and a MIP to plan CLF CONSOLs.
Borden answers that:
• We need 11 T-AKEs, plus one to allow for mainte-
nance availability and shipyard periods;
• Rather than a single, static, optimal T-AKE load, we
simply need to load what is needed each time we load
it; and
• T-AKE can not only shuttle to CONSOL faster BGs,
but can also join with a T-AO to serve as a station ship
pair for a BG, even though this pair is not as fast as
its BG customer.
Borden offers a serendipitous insight, discovered by the
optimization: forward pre-positioning of a T-AKE to make a
timely first CONSOL of an emergent deploying battle group
as it speeds by still permits the slower T-AKE to head to a for-
ward logistics site, reload, and follow the faster battle group
in time to join it in the destination area of operation. Once
there, T-AKE is fast enough to shuttle to and from CONSOL
rendezvous with the faster battle group. With multiple battle
group deployers, andmore than one T-AKE, evenmore inter-
esting chess moves arise, but all with the same essence: antic-
ipate the position of the BGs, top them off as they pass, then
follow them to their area of operation and serve them there.
Borden also evaluates the effects of improving port loading
time, decreasing the distance to forward logistics sites and/or
at-sea station ships (resupply ships prepositioned in advan-
taged locations to reload shuttle ships), and either increasing
shuttle ship speed or slowing planned BG speed.
We initially distinguished between a station ship and its
companion BG ships, with shuttle ship consolidating the sta-
tion ship, and the station ship, in turn, providing UNREPs to
its companions in the BG. This turns out to be more detail
than we need, so we now just consider the station ship as
organic with its BG, and plan CONSOLs of the BG.
Subsequently, the navy announced plans to purchase 12
T-AKEs. (This is one more than shown in Figure 1 for the
2020 force plan.)
Givens [15] evaluates a proposednewT-AOE(X) ship, each
of which would replace both a T-AKE and a T-AO with a
faster (and much more expensive) station ship.
Givens refines logistics planning factors by ship type and
employment state, including details of UNREP approach,
rig and unrig times, and transfer rates. Givens highlights
the influence of the minimum inventory levels for combat-
ants that we use to trigger extraordinary efforts to CONSOL.
Givens also introduces restrictions on shuttle access to ports,
to preclude consideration of silly trans-global transits and
limit the sheer size of our planning problems.
Givens concludes thatwe can support his scenarioswithout
T-AOE(X), but that the cost is an increase in “off station time,”
when station ships must break company with their customer
ships to resupply.
Cardillo [7] examines a 90-day scenario deploying every
available naval combatant. He investigates how CLF can
best support forces concentrating on one major theater con-
flict while holding back a secondary contingency, and then
turning to deal with the secondary action. His scenarios
orchestrate CLF ships moving to one theater, and then
transitioning to another. He also anticipates activating and
deploying navy reserve-fleet tankers to supplement the active
CLF fleet.
Even in the basic scenario, where all ports in both theaters
are open to our CLF transports, several BGs get uncomfort-
ably close to running out of fuel in an optimal solution. One
BG arrives in the second theater and gets to within one day
of running out of DFM, and another gets within three days
of a DFM runout. This is a completely unacceptable situation
for a BG commander, who prefers to maintain at least ten to
twelve days of fuel in reserve. The result points to an urgent
need for more logistical support in a two-theater scenario,
especially during the swing between theaters.
DeGrange [10] models CLF operations with a forward sea
logistics base—an at-sea logistics facility made up of ships
that can support direct operations inland without amphibious
assault or permissive access to nearly port facilities. He
also evaluates navy conversion to a single distillate fuel,
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in lieu of DFM for ships and JP5 for aircraft. His scenario
includes a period of humanitarian assistance following mili-
tary action, and this puts the T-AKE convertible dry storage
compartments to good use.
His results show that, for example, increasing safety-stock
requirements from 50 to 60% of full levels requires a sig-
nificant increase (from seven to nine) in the number of CLF
transports required to support sea-basing operations. Con-
verting to a single fuel can reduce the number of T-AOs
required from four to three, and also reduces the total number
of T-AO CONSOLs.
Doyle [12] distills all these prior contributions, further
refines logistics planning factors, and examines the nuances
of CLF ship ownership and control. Each CLF ship is cus-
tomarily assigned to operate in one of the navy’s five num-
bered fleet areas of responsibility worldwide (e.g., Third
Fleet extends from the western shores of the Americas to
the international dateline). While this may make sense for
administrative purposes, during multiple, major worldwide
deployments CLF ships may need to leave their home areas.
Fleet commanders may be a bit possessive and resist giving
up “their” CLF ships. Doyle illustrates quite convincingly
how damaging this can be to CLF effectiveness.
Doyle also evaluates an operational model improvement
by which a shuttle ship can CONSOL two BGs, on differ-
ent days of course, in one sortie from a port. Surprisingly,
this generalization seldom makes any improvement. When
you consider the off-station time required for such less-than-
maximal deliveries, they are not attractive. Of course, this
is planning. In real-life operations, we will do whatever we
need to do to sustain combatants.
11. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATION:
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
We use the General AlgebraicModeling Language and the
CPLEX MIP solver (respective versions 22.3 and 10 at this
writing) [14] on WINTEL personal computers. A represen-
tative GAMS script totals about 7000 source lines, including
an imported scenario data script.
Most of this GAMS code filters data and diagnoses curiosi-
ties in the scenario. E.g., a minor data entry error of a single
daily BG longitude—one too small to see right away in a
graphical interface sea routemap—mightmake thatBGmove
at 100 knots for a couple of days, and this will be tough for
CLF to keep up with. Similarly, a unit error for a logistics
planning factor, say BBL instead of KBBL for DFM con-
sumption, can wreak havoc if not detected and diagnosed
immediately. Even (perhaps especially) with sophisticated
data bases, errors happen. We have built in a lot of “tribal
wisdom” to save ourselves time, frustration, and (maybe)
embarrassment.
We have had to remove the Floyd-Warshall shortest-path
computations fromGAMS to an external C procedure, where
it runs many orders of magnitude faster than in GAMS. This
external procedure reads an input file from GAMS, com-
putes all shortest paths, and writes an output file for GAMS
to use. We compute a check-sum of all the data that influ-
ences the shortest paths, and record this signature with the
file. Every time we run our GAMS script, it repeats the (fast)
computation of this signature checksum and verifies that the
shortest-path file it imports is still valid, or complains that
something has changed influencing sea route shortest paths,
writes a file for the external procedure to use as input, and
insists the file be refreshed by the external procedure.
Some scenarios are large and long, and the integer MIPs
that result can have several million constraints and several
million binary variables. We have trouble solving these mod-
els in reasonable time. The old planning adage applies here
that you have to be able to come up with an answer while
your client still remembers the question.
Accordingly, we have introduced some expedient methods
to accelerate solution times.
For instance, we sometimes reduce the geographic range
and number of ports available to each shuttle ship, and reduce
the set of BGs served by each shuttle ship. This works espe-
cially well when we have scenarios with two or more geo-
graphically remote, and thus essentially physically disjoint
missions to deal with at once—our common sense helps the
optimization ignore lots of desperate, bad options.
However, for some large-scale, long-term, and thus world-
wide scenarios, restricting CLF maneuvers to a subset of
customers is not realistic.
Solving amonolithic planning problem, we specify a max-
imum solve time and a maximum acceptable interval of
uncertainty–the relative or absolute difference between the
value of the best integer solution found and an upper bound
on this value. If we do not satisfy this tolerance in the allotted
solve time, we resort to a time-myopic problem cascade; by
coincidence, this derives from earlier ship-scheduling work
by Brown, et al. [[5]; see p. 341], though the idea has been
used since in many other planning contexts.
Our cascade is defined with three terms: days in planning
horizon, days in planning window, and days advanced per
solve. For the simple example in Fig. 3, these are, respec-
tively, 30, 10, and5days.Aswe advance the planningwindow
through the number of days comprising the planning horizon,
we divide the optimization into three components: history,
current planning window, and future. In the initial step, the
first MIP solves only the current planning window, returning
a solution when the integer tolerance is satisfied. The sec-
ond MIP then advances to the next planning window, fixing
the last-determined values for those variables in our history,
and relaxes all historic constraints save those that still have
influence on the new current planning window. We pay no
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Figure 3. Example of a time-myopic problem cascade. We solve a 30-day planning horizon by considering a sliding planning window of
10 days, and advancing this planning window 5 days at a time. As we advance, we fix our history at that last seen in a planning window. For
example, in the third integer program, we have 10 days of decisions that are fixed (days 1–10), ten days of decisions available to the model
(days 11–20), and ten days that do not yet appear in the model (days 21–30). Figure from Doyle [12].
attention to the variables and data for future time periods until
they comprise part of the current planning window. This iter-
ation repeats until the final day of the planning horizon is
included in the current planning horizon.
We add another key feature to our cascade: When we can-
not solve a current planning window in a specified amount
of time, our solver memorizes the last, “goal day” of this
solve window, then halves the window length and the number
of the days to advance to solve this new, and now smaller,
planning window. Despite the reduced planning window, the
MIP advances from where we last started and attempts to
once again solve the current cascade window. If necessary,
this halving continues recursively until a planning window
of only two days, and an advance of just one day might fail,
in which hypothetical case we would abnormally terminate.
When we finally solve a planning window that ends on or
after the goal day, we restore the days in the current planning
window and the days advanced per solve to their original val-
ues until we either reach the end of the planning horizon, or
need to repeat the recursive steps when we cannot solve a
subsequent current planning window.
In practice, with an initial planning window spanning the
full planning horizon, if we allow reasonablemaximum solve
time and interval of uncertainty, the automatic, emergent
planning window reduction rarely activates. But, when it
does, we get an alarm, and still reliably get a planning solu-
tion. This is a robust solution scheme. And, an alarm is a
valuable telltale of model trouble.
When the planning window is a subset of the planning
horizon, the variables we fix during the early periods have an
impact on the later decision variables as the history period
grows. For example, a T-AO replenishment on day 3 of a
30-day scenario may offer the optimal solution for this cur-
rent planningwindow. However, establishing this same T-AO
replenishment on day 3 of the 181-day scenario could result
in a sub-optimal solution for the complete scenario, because
the day 3 replenishment does not “anticipate” necessary later
requirements in the complete planning horizon.Wemight see
this same effect in the initial prepositioning of CLF shuttles.
We allow themodel to locate shuttles based on the initial plan-
ning window regardless of later requirements in the planning
horizon.
Admittedly, when our cascade planning window is (or
becomes) shorter than the planning horizon, this returns a
restricted solution, and we forfeit the certificate of solution
quality we would otherwise attain.
Nevertheless, a time-myopic optimization may be more
realistic than the omniscient, global monolithic one. Our
scenario, dependent on known consumption and capacity
data, assumes deterministic demand, allowing us to antici-
pate every future battle group nuance. Such omniscience is
arguably “too optimal.” The temporal cascade more closely
mimics CLF planning that considers recent history and a rea-
sonable forecast of near-term demands to develop shuttle
schedules for upcoming sorties. While we concede formal
optimality, and admit that the current planning window does
not consider possible future spikes in demand, actual expe-
rience reveals that a cascade returns feasible solutions that
are not far from omniscient-optimal. The cascade offers us a
reliable solution strategy and can potentially highlight unusu-
ally challenging windows of the planning horizon, through
the need to recursively halve the planning window, to alert
CLFand individual fleet planners to the need for added shuttle
capacity.
For exploratory optimization to merely assemble and fil-
ter scenario data for errors—preparatory exercises we admit
take much more of our time than making subsequent model
plays for the record after we have the problem shaped and
debugged—the cascade can solve the largest problems in a
minute or two on a personal computer. For important plays
where we really need a solution quality certificate, or for
cases where we must compare two alternatives and come to
an unambiguous choice of the better one,wemay spend hours
solving a monolith model.
An example planning scenario includes 13 battle groups
served by nine TAO and seven T-AKE shuttle ships over a
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90-day planning horizon. Some of the larger battle groups
are accompanied by station ships. Five of the battle groups
are deployed on day one, and the rest deploy on day 10, 12,
etc., until all are underway to their various areas of operation
worldwide. Amonolithic (i.e., omniscient) solve of this situa-
tiongenerates anoptimizationmodelwith about 367,000 con-
straints and about 23,000 variables. A cascade (i.e., myopic)
solve using a 30-day planning windows advanced 15 days
at a time yields a sequence of problems with between about
37,000 and 75,000 constraints and between 6000 and 9000
variables. The monolith takes several hours to solve on a 2-
9 GHz WINTEL laptop, whereas the cascade takes a few
minutes. For this particular case, the two solutions compare
closely. TheCLFfleet conducts a total of 101CONSOLs. The
availability in this scenario of forward (i.e., close to the areas
of operation) supply base ports is key: our average cycle times
from a CONSOL back to a port and on to the next CONSOL
is only just over five days, two of which are spent pierside
loading the shuttle ship.
A hard-to-solveMIP typically arises at the end of a succes-
sion of playswith afixed scenariowe try to sustainwith fewer,
and fewer, and finally the absolute minimum number of CLF
ships. Given the cost of building any CLF ship, you can see
how such a scenario arises. Realistically, these at-the-edge
plans are so fragile, we are uncomfortable advising them.
We think our most important model feature is seen in con-
straints (1) and (2), along with elastic variables for shortage
and extremis shortage.Acumulant inventory constraint, com-
bined with an elastic violation device for a shortage, and
another for extremis shortage, combine to signal a deficiency,
and carry this forward, paying a daily penalty, until this
deficiency is remediated. The distinction between shortage
and extremis penalties is important: CLF ships are equitably
assigned to CONSOL all customers by maximizing deliv-
eries, to preferentially serve needy customers by CONSOL
to avoid shortage, and to energetically serve customers in
extremis. For more motivation, see Brown, et al. [4].
We use four commodity groups because this is a natural
aggregation of at-sea logistics, and forecasting at more than
this level of detail with logistic planning factors for each bat-
tle group, daily, over a long planning horizon, is daunting at
this scale. We have experimented with more commodities,
and there is no technical reason we could not accommodate
this detail, but the four aggregate groups we now use are an
adequate logistical representation of the demands we satisfy
at sea.
12. CONCLUSIONS
We have been able to answer some important exigent
strategic and operational questions about our Combat
Logistics Force. The planning factors and ancillary tools
developed to support this work provide a reliable foundation
upon which fleet planners can base a comparative analy-
sis. Clearly-stated modeling and data assumptions combine
with mathematical optimization to render advice with two
distinguishing advantages: optimization has earned its repu-
tation for teasing some surprising insights from the scenarios,
and each monolithic solution comes with a quality certificate
assuring that no better solution remains undiscovered. These
advantages convey an unusual level of confidence, especially
in comparison to ubiquitous simulation tools.
We have been studying these problems long enough now
to see some of our prescriptions come to life in the CLF fleet.
The basic question is always “Canwe logistically support this
plan?” The plans, and there are a lot of these we constantly
tend, express our navy’s commitments to support current
defense doctrine (e.g., see the latest Quadrennial Defense
Review [11].
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